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A Right to Privacy for Gay People Under 
International Human Rights Law 
INTRODUCTION 
Abusive treatment of gay people is a global problem. Iran has 
imposed death sentences on gay men and lesbians. l In Columbia 
and Peru, gay activists have received death threats from "goon 
squads."2 Gay rights organizations have been banned in Argen-
tina, and the police have harassed homosexuals there.3 On the 
Isle of Man, the local parliament has refused to repeal a local 
statute banning homosexual sodomy despite pressure from the 
Parliament at Westminster.4 
Despite such flagrant human rights violations, the international 
human rights community has remained silent. The United Na-
tions Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations has refused 
to admit the International Lesbian and Gay Organization because 
the U.N. delegate from Libya denounced the group as immora1.5 
Amnesty International has refused to monitor state persecution 
of gay men and lesbians because it does not want "to impose its 
own morality on the world."6 
1 Susan Schmitz, Gay Executions in Iran Continue, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, June 10-16, 
1990, at 2. 
2 Darrel Y. Rist, Homosexuals and Human Rights, 250 THE NATION 482, 483 (1990); Chris 
Nealon, Anti-gay Attacks Up in Peru, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, Dec. 23, 1989-Jan. 6, 1990, 
at 2. 
• Rist, supra note 2, at 483; Argentina Urged to Allow Gay Group, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 5, 
1991, at E9. 
• Dean Nelson, Isle of Man Set to Deny Whitehall on Gays Law, THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 
3, 1991, Home News Page, at 9. 
5 Elizabeth Yukins, U.N. Defers Decision About Gay Group, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, Feb. 
18-24, 1991, at 2. 
6 Rist, supra note 2, at 483. At its biennial conference in September 1991, Amnesty 
International, under pressure from gay rights groups, reversed itself and adopted the 
position that persons imprisoned for being gay are prisoners of conscience. Amnesty Opts 
for Gay Rights, LESBIAN/GAY LAw NOTES (Lesbian & Gay Law Association at Greater New 
York, New York, NY), Oct. 1991, at 67. 
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The human rights issues surrounding such incidents are nu-
merous. Various international human rights instruments7 grant 
to individuals freedom of association.s Likewise, they grant free-
dom from cruel and unusual punishment9 and rights to 
consciencelO and privacy. I I 
This Comment examines the right to privacy in international 
law and the protections that it offers gay people. Part I of this 
Comment briefly reviews the development of international hu-
man rights law following the Second World War. Part II discusses 
7 These international human rights covenants include the American Convention on 
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 [hereinafter American Convention]; the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force), Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter International Cove-
nant]; and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]. 
8 The right to associate freely is a guaranteed right in the major international human 
rights covenants. See American Convention, supra note 7, at art. 16; International Cove-
nant, supra note 7, at art. 22; European Convention, supra note 7, at art. ll; Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. Al81O, at art. 20 (1948) 
[hereinafter Universal Declaration]. 
9 The international human rights covenants safeguard the individual from cruel and 
unusual punishment. See American Convention, supra note 7, at art. 5; International 
Covenant, supra note 7, at art. 7; European Convention, supra note 7, at art. 2; Universal 
Declaration, supra note 8, at art. 5. 
10 The international human rights covenants guarantee to individuals the right to 
conscience. See American Convention, supra note 7, at art. 12; International Covenant, 
supra note 7, at art. 18; European Convention, supra note 7, at art. 9; Universal Decla-
ration, supra note 8, at art. 18. 
The Universal Declaration states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and 
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." Universal Declaration, 
supra note 8, at art. 18. 
The International Covenant states: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in 
public and private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice and teaching. 
International Covenant, supra note 7, at art. 18(1). 
The European Convention states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and 
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance." European Conven-
tion, supra note 7, at art. 9(1). 
The American Convention states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience 
and of religion. This right includes freedom to maintain or to change one's religion or 
beliefs, and freedom to profess or disseminate one's religion or beliefs, either individually 
or together with others, in public or private." American Convention, supra note 7, at art. 
12(1). 
11 See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
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the right to privacy guaranteed in those instruments. Part III 
reviews case law exploring the scope of the right to privacy, 
particularly with regard to gay people. Part IV examines cultural 
opposition to homosexuality. Part V analyzes the possible expan-
sion of the right to privacy to include gay men and lesbians and 
explores the need to balance this right with the right of societies 
to maintain their cultural values. This Comment concludes that 
the right to privacy in international law should be expanded to 
protect gay people. 
I. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
While international law has long recognized that states have a 
duty to treat aliens humanely,12 it has recognized no similar duty 
with regard to a state's own nationals. 13 Only following World 
War II did international human rights law evolve to limit state 
power in this regard. 14 
The United Nations Charter (U.N. Charter or Charter) was 
first to recognize limits on a state's power against its own nationals. 
The Charter requires the United Nations to promote "universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without any distinction as to race, sex, language, 
or religion."15 It also requires all member states to cooperate with 
the United Nations in the promotion of human rights. 16 
The U.N. Charter, however, provides no catalog of these fun-
damental freedoms. At the time of the drafting of the Charter, 
the delegates recognized the need to develop such an interna-
tional "Bill of Rights."17 Subsequently, the U.N. General Assembly 
approved Resolution 217(III), the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (Universal Declaration). The Universal Declaration 
outlines these basic human rights in its 30 articles. 18 
The legal status of the Universal Declaration has been the 
subject of much debate. 19 Some legal scholars maintain that al-
12 PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 11-12 (1983). 
13 [d. at 11. 
14 See id. at 14. 
15 U.N. CHARTER arts. 55(c), 1(3). 
16 [d. at art. 56. Article 56 states: "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and 
separate action in co-operation with the Organization for achievement of the purposes 
set forth in Article 55." [d. 
17 See ARTHUR H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 24-25 (1972). 
18 See generally, Universal Declaration, supra note 8. 
19 SIEGHART, supra note 12, at 53. 
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though the Universal Declaration possesses great moral and po-
litical authority, it cannot itself create legally binding obligations 
under international law.20 Many other commentators argue that 
the Universal Declaration either codifies customary international 
law or has become customary international law from the consis-
tent practice of states.21 Some authorities argue that the Universal 
Declaration is at least binding on members of the United Na-
tions. 22 
Although its legal status has been debated, the Universal Dec-
laration has inspired several international and regional human 
rights covenants, including the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms (European Conven-
tion),23 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(International Covenant),24 and the American Convention on Hu-
man Rights (American Convention).25 Like the Universal Decla-
ration, these international human rights covenants outline a "Bill 
of Rights."26 Unlike the Universal Declaration, the international 
20 See ill.; ROBERTSON, supra note 17, at 26-27. These authorities examine the debate 
concerning the legal status of the Universal Declaration. Proponents of the view that the 
Universal Declaration is just a statement of policy point to the Preamble of the Universal 
Declaration, which states: 
Now, therefore, the General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as the common standard of achievement for all peoples and all 
nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this 
Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote 
respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and 
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, 
both among the peoples of the Member States themselves and among the peoples 
of territories under their jurisdiction. 
Universal Declaration, supra note 8, at pmbl. (emphasis added). For a discussion of this 
view, see SIEGHART, supra note 12, at 53; ROBERTSON, supra note 17, at 26-27. 
21 See SIEGHART, supra note 12, at 53; ROBERTSON, supra note 17, at 27-28. These 
commentators examine the views of those who maintain that the Universal Declaration is 
now customary international law. Proponents of this view point to the consistent practice 
of states and international bodies of invoking the provisions of the Universal Declaration 
which has caused its contents to become customary international law. For a discussion of 
their views, see SIEGHART, supra note 12, at 53; ROBERTSON, supra note 17, at 27-28. 
22 SIEGHART, supra note 12, at 53. This commentator examines the arguments of those 
who believe that the Universal Declaration is binding on all U.N. members under article 
56 of the U.N. Charter, which requires member states to promote human rights in 
cooperation with the United Nations. [d. The Universal Declaration was intended as an 
enumeration of those rights the members are required to promote under article 56. See 
ill. 
2g See European Convention, supra note 7, at pmbl. 
24 See International Covenant, supra note 7, at pmbl. 
25 See American Convention, supra note 7, at pmbl. 
26 See generally American Convention, supra note 7; International Covenant, supra note 
7; European Convention, supra note 7. 
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human rights covenants create absolute and immediate obliga-
tions on the state parties,27 requiring states to modify their do-
mestic law to conform to the covenants' provisions.28 The cove-
nants state that all persons are entitled to the equal protection of 
the rights guaranteed,29 and they oblige state parties to provide 
domestic remedies for violations of these rights.3o In addition, 
the covenants create international tribunals with varying degrees 
of power to supervise and enforce compliance with their provi-
sions.3! 
Neither the Universal Declaration nor the covenants extend 
absolute rights. They recognize limitations and restrictions on the 
exercise of individual rights. 32 The covenants qualify the individ-
ual's rights with one's obligations to the family,33 the community,34 
27 American Convention. supra note 7, at art. 1; International Covenant, supra note 7, 
at art. 2(1); European Convention, supra note 7, at art. 1. 
28 American Convention, supra note 7, at art. 25; International Covenant, supra note 
7, at art. 2(2). 
29 American Convention, supra note 7, at art. 1; International Covenant, supra note 7, 
at arts. 2(1), 3, and 26; European Convention, supra note 7, at art. 14. 
30 American Convention, supra note 7, at art. 25(1); International Covenant, supra note 
7, at art. 2(3); European Convention, supra note 7, at art. 13. 
31 See SIEGHART, supra note 12, at 45-46. The international tribunals created under 
the human rights instruments include the U.N. Human Rights Committee (under the 
International Covenant), the European Court of Human Rights and the European Com-
mission of Human Rights (under the European Convention), and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (under 
the American Convention). 
32 American Convention, supra note 7, at art. 32(1); International Covenant, supra note 
7, at art. 47; Universal Declaration, supra note 8, at art. 29. The Universal Declaration 
imposes a general restriction in article 29 upon the rights recognized in the instrument: 
(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible. 
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only 
to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing 
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting 
the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a 
democratic society. 
Universal Declaration, supra note 8, at art. 29. 
Likewise, the American Convention imposes a general restriction in article 32(2) on the 
rights it recognizes: "(1) Every person has responsibilities to his family, his community, 
and mankind. (2) The rights and freedoms of each person are limited by the rights of 
others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare in a 
democratic society." American Convention, supra note 7, at art. 32. 
The International Covenant imposes a similar, but narrower restriction in article 47: 
"Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of 
all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources." 
International Covenant, supra note 7, at art. 47. 
33 American Convention, supra note 7, at art. 32(1). 
34 /d.; Universal Declaration, supra note 8, at art. 29( 1). 
146 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XV, No.1 
and mankind.35 In addition, states may lawfully restrict an indi-
vidual's rights to protect the rights of others,36 the general wel-
fare,37 public order,38 morality,39 and the security of all.40 Many 
articles granting rights also include specific restrictions on those 
rights.41 
Where the covenants recognize such restrictions on the exercise 
of individual freedoms, they must be interpreted narrowly.42 Only 
criteria specifically listed in the covenants can be used to justify 
the application of restrictions.43 In addition, these criteria cannot 
be read in a manner rendering the right a nullity.44 
The Universal Declaration and the covenants provide a frame-
work for the international protection of human rights. Besides 
setting a standard for human rights protection, they provide a 
means of enforcement. Within this framework, gay men and 
lesbians may be able to find the means to protect their human 
rights. 
II. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. The Right to Privacy in International Human Rights Instruments 
The right to privacy is guaranteed in the Universal Decla-
ration,45 the International Covenant,46 the European Conven-
35 American Convention, supra note 7, at art. 32(1). 
36 /d. at art. 32(2); Universal Declaration, supra note 8, at art. 29(2). 
37 American Convention, supra note 7, at art. 32(2); Universal Declaration, supra note 
8, at art. 29(2). 
38 Universal Declaration, supra note 8, at art. 29(2). 
39 [d. 
40 American Convention, supra note 7, at art. 32(2). 
41 SIEGHART, supra note 12, at 88-9D. 
42 Caprino v. United Kingdom, 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 284, 294 (extract of 
case heard before Commission); SIEGHART, supra note 12, at 91 ("The general rule is the 
protection of the freedom; the exception is the restriction. The restriction may not be 
applied in a sense that completely suppresses the freedom, but only insofar as necessary 
for preserving the values which the paragraph exhaustively enumerates and protects."). 
43 Caprino, 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. at 294; SIEGHART, supra note 12, at 91 ("All 
exception clauses must be strictly interpreted, and no other criteria than those mentioned 
in that clause itself may be the basis of any restriction on the right protected.") . 
.. SIEGHART, supra note 12, at 91. 
4. Universal Declaration, supra note 8, at art. 12. Article 12 states: "No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor 
to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of 
law against such interference or attacks." [d. 
46 International Covenant, supra note 7, at art. 17. Article 17 states: "(I) No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
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tion,47 and the American Convention.48 None of these instru-
ments recognizes this right in absolute terms. Rather, each limits 
the scope of the protection, recognizing offsetting interests to 
which the right to privacy must yield.49 
The Universal Declaration guarantees a limited right to pri-
vacy.50 It protects an individual's privacy only from "arbitrary 
interference."51 In addition, like all other rights recognized in the 
Universal Declaration, the right to privacy is limited by obligations 
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. (2) Everyone has 
the right to protection of law against such interference or attacks." [d. 
47 European Convention, supra note 7, at art. 8. Article 8 states: 
[d. 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the eco-
nomic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others. 
48 American Convention, supra note 7, at art. 11. Article 11 states: 
[d. 
(1) Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recog-
nized. 
(2) No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his 
private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks 
on his honor and reputation. 
(3) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference 
or attacks. 
49 See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text. 
50 Universal Declaration, supra note 8, at art. 12. Some authorities take the position 
that the entire Universal Declaration has the status of customary international law. For a 
discussion of the views of these authorities, see SIEGHART, supra note 12, at 53; ROBERTSON, 
supra note 17, at 27-28. Such a position would logically include the right to privacy. 
The American Law Institute has taken the position that although all of the Universal 
Declaration is not customary international law, the right to privacy has achieved that 
status. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 702 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Section 702 states that: 
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, 
encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the murder 
or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, or (g) a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
With regard to § 702(g), comment k states that rights guaranteed in the Universal 
Declaration and the principal international covenants are internationally recognized 
rights. [d. at § 702, cmt. k. Among such fundamental rights are the "privacy of the home" 
and "basic privacy such as the right to marry and raise a family." [d. A consistent pattern 
of unjustified state intrusion on the right to privacy would be a violation of customary 
international law. 
5l Universal Declaration, supra note 8, at art. 12. 
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to one's community. 52 The right to privacy is also subject to lawful 
limitations, which are necessary to protect morality and the rights 
of others in a democratic society.53 
Like the Universal Declaration, the American Convention rec-
ognizes a limited right to privacy. It protects individuals from 
"arbitrary or abusive interference" with their privacy. 54 In addi-
tion, like all other rights recognized in the American Convention, 
the need in a democratic society to protect the general welfare 
and rights of others can limit the individual's right to privacy.55 
The European Convention similarly guarantees the right to 
privacy. 56 It permits public authorities to interfere with this right, 
however, to protect public morality and the rights and freedoms 
of others.57 Such interference must, however, be lawful and nec-
essary in a democratic society. 58 
The International Covenant, like the Universal Declaration, 
guarantees the right to privacy. It protects individuals from "ar-
bitrary and unlawful" interference with their privacy. 59 Unlike 
the Universal Declaration, however, the International Covenant 
recognizes no other pertinent limitations on this right. 60 
All the international human rights instruments recognize the 
individual's right to privacy. They also permit, to varying degrees, 
some restrictions on that right. Consequently, the scope of the 
right to privacy and, thus, its ability to offer human rights pro-
tection to gay people remains unclear. 
B. Interests Protected 
The restrictions recognized in the previously described inter-
national human rights instruments are not the only source of 
uncertainty regarding the right to privacy. The concept of privacy 
itself is not defined in any of the instruments. Indeed, various 
52 [d. at art. 29(1). 
53 [d. at art. 29(2). 
54 American Convention, supra note 7, at art. 11(2). 
55 [d. at art. 32(2). 
56 European Convention, supra note 7, at art. 8(1). 
57 [d. at art. 8(2). 
58 [d. 
59 International Covenant, supra note 7, at art. 17(1). 
60 See generally International Covenant, supra note 7. The only general restriction on 
the rights recognized in the International Covenant is that none of the rights granted is 
to be interpreted as "impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully 
and freely their natural wealth and resources." [d. at art. 47. 
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legal systems understand the concept of privacy differently.61 
Some legal scholars have suggested that the right to privacy pro-
tects the individual only from unwanted publicity.62 Others have 
suggested a broader definition, including the right to physical 
and mental integrity, and moral and intellectual freedom.63 
Although the concept of privacy is still not clearly defined, 
there is ample opportunity and a pressing need for international 
jurists to define it.64 Interpreting the scope of the right to privacy 
in the conventions, however, requires strict adherence to rules of 
treaty interpretation.65 The texts of the relevant articles must be 
interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary mean-
ing to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose."66 Supplementary means of 
interpretation are acceptable when necessary.67 The opinions of 
respected jurists are one recognized supplementary means avail-
able to define the concept of the right to privacy in international 
human rights instruments.68 
61 JACQUES VELU, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right to Respect for 
Private Life, the Home and Communications, in PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 34 (1973). Ve1u 
believes that "the scope of the right to respect for private life depends on current manners 
and custom and varies from place to place, even in Europe. This explains why it is difficult 
to found a broad definition of this concept on any common legal tradition." [d. In addition, 
Ve1u maintains that all individuals cannot expect the same privacy rights because "the 
wall around a person's private life is not identically situated with everyone." [d. 
62 SIEGHART, supra note 12, at 313. 
63 RICHARD B. LILLICH, Civil Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 
(1984); VELU, supra note 61, at 36. Some argue that the right to privacy includes protection 
from: 
(1) Attacks on physical and mental integrity or moral and intellectual freedom. 
(2) Attacks on honor and reputation and similar torts. 
(3) The use of name, identity, or likeness. 
(4) Being spied upon, watched, or harassed. 
(5) The disclosure of information protected by the duty of professional secrecy. 
LILLICH, supra, at 148. 
64 LILLICH, supra note 63, at 149. 
65 J. G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 63-64 (1988). 
66 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 
V.N.T.S. 331 at art. 31 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
67 [d. at art. 32. Article 32 states: 
[d. 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine 
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the 
meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd 
or unreasonable. 
68 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, art. 38(1)(d), 59 Stat. 
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The scope of the right to privacy in these instruments is critical 
for gay people. If the right to privacy is interpreted broadly to 
provide a realm of personal autonomy free from unjustified state 
intrusion, decisions about personal and sexual relationships could 
arguably fall within that realm. Such a broad interpretation of 
the right to privacy could provide a legal basis for protecting gay 
people from state persecution. 
III. THE PRIVACY RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE IN VARIOUS LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 
The opinions of respected jurists are one supplementary means 
available to define the scope of the right to privacy in interna-
tional human rights instruments.69 Both the European Court of 
Human Rights (European Court) and the U.S. Supreme Court 
have addressed the privacy rights of gay men and lesbians. These 
courts, however, have arrived at different results. The European 
Court has held that the right to privacy guaranteed in article 8 
of the European Convention protects gay people from state in-
terference.7o The Supreme Court has held that the right to pri-
vacy under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
does not provide protection to gay people.71 
A. The European Human Rights Convention 
Case law construing the European Convention supports a 
broad interpretation of the right to privacy. In Dudgeon v. United 
Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held that North-
ern Ireland's sodomy statutes banning sexual activity between 
males, without regard to age,72 violated the right to privacy guar-
1055, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter Statute of the I.C.].]. Article 38 of the Statute of the 
I.C.]. states that "subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law" include 
'~udicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations .... " [d. 
69 /d. 
70 See infra notes 72-109 and accompanying text. 
71 See infra notes 110-26 and accompanying text. 
72 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 EUR. H.R. REp. 149, 168 (1981). Sections 61 and 62 
of the Offenses Against the Persons Act of 1861 (1861 Act) prohibited buggery or attempts 
to commit buggery. Buggery was defined as "sexual intercourse per anum by a man with 
a man or a woman, or per anum or per vaginam by a man or a woman with an animal." [d. 
at 151. The maximum sentence for buggery was life imprisonment. Attempts to commit 
buggery were punishable by up to ten years in prison. [d. Section 11 of the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act of 1885 proscribed any act of "gross indecency" (not defined in the 
1992] GAY PRIVACY RIGHTS 151 
anteed under article 8 of the European Convention. The United 
Kingdom had argued that article 8(2) of the Convention permit-
ted the challenged legislation. That article allows states to restrict 
an individual's privacy, where lawful and necessary in a demo-
cratic society, to protect morals and the rights and freedoms of 
others. 73 The United Kingdom maintained that the legislation 
was needed in Northern Ireland to safeguard public morality and 
to protect the interests of those persons in need of special pro-
tection-for example, the young and the mentally handicapped-
from sexual exploitation.74 
The European Court rejected the United Kingdom's argument. 
The Court agreed that the regulation of homosexual activity 
might be necessary to some degree. 75 It concluded, however, that 
blanket prohibitions against all private homosexual activity were 
not "necessary in a democratic society" to protect public morals 
and to prevent the sexual exploitation of the young or mentally 
handicapped.76 
In its analysis of whether the statutes were "necessary," the 
European Court defined the concept of necessity quite strictly. 77 
It stated that interference with the right to privacy is not "nec-
essary in a democratic society" simply because it is "useful, rea-
statute) between males, with a maximum sentence of two years in prison. Id. The Sexual 
Offenses Act of 1967 effectively repealed these two statutes in the rest of the United 
Kingdom, decriminalizing most homosexual conduct between persons 21 and over. Id. at 
152-53. These statutes remained in force in Northern Ireland because of public oppo-
sition to repeal, manifested in a highly unusual coalition between Northern Ireland's 
Catholic and Protestant churches. Id. at 154-58. 
73 Id.; European Convention, supra note 7, at art. 8(2). 
74 Dudgeon, 4 EUR. H.R. REP. at 162. 
75 Id. at 163. 
76 See id. at 164. 
77 Id. at 164-65. The majority stated: 
Id. 
First, "necessary" in this context does not have the flexibility of such expressions 
as "useful," "reasonable," or "desirable," but implies the existence of a "pressing 
social need" for the interference in question. 
In the second place, it is for the national authorities to make the initial assess-
ment of the pressing social need in each case; accordingly, a margin of appre-
ciation is left with them. However, their decision remains subject to review by 
the court .... 
Finally, in article 8 as in several other articles of the Convention, the notion of 
"necessity" is linked to that of a "democratic society." According to the Court's 
case-law, a restriction on a Convention right cannot be regarded as "necessary in 
a democratic society" (two hallmarks of which are tolerance and broad minded-
ness) unless, amongst other things, it is proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued. 
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sonable, or desirable" to protect morality or the rights of others.78 
Rather, such interference is "necessary" only in response to a 
"pressing social need" to protect morals or the rights of others.79 
Where the need for interference is "pressing," it must be pro-
portional to the burden imposed on the individual.80 
The Court concluded that only it could make the ultimate 
assessment regarding the necessity of such restrictions.8l The 
Court indicated that in analyzing the necessity of legislation to 
protect morals, it would respect the assessment of local authori-
ties.82 Such deference could not be unlimited, however, especially 
when the local action interfered with "a most intimate aspect of 
private life."83 
The European Court stated that moral opposition to homosex-
uality in Northern Ireland was a factor to be considered in de-
termining whether there was a pressing need for the statutes 
protecting public morality.84 The Court recognized the need not 
to impose values from outside but to examine the statutes "in the 
context of Northern Ireland society."85 Nonetheless, it suspected 
that the United Kingdom's representation of moral opposition 
was exaggerated. The Court noted that in Northern Ireland itself, 
officials had not enforced the statutes in recent years. 86 As a result 
of this failure to enforce the statutes, it found no injury to N orth-
ern Ireland's moral standards or any public demand for stricter 
enforcement. 87 
78 !d. at 164. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 165. 
81 Id. at 164. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 165. 
84 Id. at 166. The majority stated: 
Id. 
As the Government correctly submitted, it follows that the moral climate in 
Northern Ireland in sexual matters. in particular as evidenced by the opposition 
to the proposed legislative change, is one of the matters which national authorities 
may legitimately take into account in exercising their discretion .... Whether 
this point of view be right or wrong, and although it may be out of line with 
current attitudes in other communities, its existence among an important sector 
of Northern Ireland society is certainly relevant for the purposes of article 8(2). 
85 Id. at 165. 
86 Id. at 167. 
87 Id. The court inferred from this public indifference that there was no deep-rooted 
opposition to private homosexual conduct between adults. Id. In his dissenting opinion, 
Judge Zekia interpreted this fact differently, concluding that the lack of public concern 
about the rarity of prosecution resulted from the fact that such offenses are quite rare, 
indicating a very deep-rooted opposition to homosexuality. Id. at 173. 
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The Court did not, however, limit its inquiry to social conditions 
in Northern Ireland. It noted dramatic social changes in the rest 
of Europe and increased tolerance for gay people.88 The Court 
cited the general decriminalization of homosexuality throughout 
Europe as evidence that it was no longer considered necessary or 
appropriate to subject private homosexual behavior between 
adults to criminal sanction in order to protect public morality.89 
The Court also rejected the argument that the statutes were 
needed to protect the young and mentally handicapped from 
sexual exploitation. It concluded that blanket prohibitions against 
homosexual conduct were overly broad,90 and that more narrowly 
drafted age of consent laws could provide such protection.91 The 
Court indicated, however, that it would defer to the assessments 
of local authorities in defining the age of consent.92 
88 Id. at 167. The majority stated: 
Id. 
As compared with the era when that legislation was enacted, there is now a better 
understanding, and in consequence an increased tolerance, of homosexual be-
haviour to the extent that in the great majority of the member-States of the 
Council of Europe it is no longer considered to be necessary or appropriate to 
treat homosexual practices of the kind now in question as in themselves a matter 
to which the sanctions of the criminal law should be applied; the Court cannot 
overlook the marked changes which have occurred in this regard in the domestic 
law of the member-States. 
89 Id. 
90 See id. at 164. 
91 Id. The majority opinion stated: 
Id. 
The Court has already acknowledged the legitimate necessity in a democratic 
society for some degree of control over homosexual conduct notably in order to 
provide safeguards against the exploitation and corruption of those who are 
specially vulnerable by reason, for example, of their youth. However, it falls in 
the first instance to the national authorities to decide on the appropriate safe-
guards of this kind required for the defence of morals in their society and, in 
particular, to fix the age under which young people should have the protection 
of the criminal law. 
92 Id. at 168-69. The United Kingdom has set the age of consent for male homosexual 
activity at 21. For all others, the age of consent is 17. This has been challenged under 
article 14 of the European Convention which states: "The enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status." 
European Convention, supra note 7, at art. 14. In Dudgeon, the plaintiff argued that the 
Northern Ireland statutes restricted his right to privacy to a greater degree than restric-
tions on male homosexuals in the rest of the United Kingdom and that they were also 
greater than those imposed on heterosexuals and lesbians in Northern Ireland. 4 EUR. 
H.R. REP. at 169. The Court in Dudgeon declined to address the article 14 argument, 
having invalidated the statutes under article 8. Id. at 170. The European Commission on 
Human Rights has not accepted these article 14 arguments. See X v. United Kingdom, 7 
EUR. H.R. REP. 145 (1984). 
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The Court concluded from this process that there was no press-
ing need for these statutes to protect public morals or to protect 
the "vulnerable sections of society. "93 The Court found that the 
need certainly was not proportional to "the detrimental effects 
which the very existence of the legislative provisions in question 
could have on the life of a person of homosexual orientation 
.... "94 Ultimately, the Court believed that although homosexual 
conduct might shock many persons, that alone could not justify 
intrusion into the private sphere.95 
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Zekia disputed the majority's 
conclusion that the statutes were not "necessary in a democratic 
society."96 Noting the united condemnation of sodomy in both 
the Christian and Moslem religions,97 he emphasized the right of 
majorities in those countries to enforce traditional morality.98 
Such communal rights, he concluded, were protected under ar-
ticles 9 and 10 of the European Convention guaranteeing free-
dom of religion and expression.99 Indeed, he concluded that 
thwarting the will of the majority in such matters would be un-
democratic. 100 
Judge Zekia concluded that these communal rights outweighed 
any individual's right to privacy. He feared that a change in the 
law would cause greater disturbance in more traditional societies 
than the majority suspected. 101 Judge Zekia believed that author-
ities in those societies were in a better position than the Court to 
93 Dudgeon, 4 EUR. H.R. REP. at 167. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 171. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 172. 
99 Id. Judge Zekia wrote: 
Id. 
Id. 
While considering the respect due to private life of a homosexual under article 
8(1), we must not forget and must bear in mind that respect is also due to the 
people holding the opposite view, especially in a country populated by a great 
majority of people who are completely against unnatural immoral practices. 
Surely the majority in a democratic society are entitled ... to respect for their 
religious and moral beliefs and entitled to teach and bring up their children 
consistently with their own religious and philosophical convictions. 
100 Id. Judge Zekia wrote: 
A democratic society is governed by the rule of the majority. It seems to me 
somewhat odd and perplexing, in considering the necessity of respect for one's 
private life, to underestimate the necessity of keeping a law in force for the 
protection of morals held in high esteem by the majority of people. 
101 Id. 
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assess both the prevailing moral standards in those countries and 
the extent to which such standards should be enforced. 102 
In a separate dissent, Judge Matscher disagreed with the ma-
jority's definition of "necessity." In his opinion, the article 8(2) 
requirement that legislation be "necessary in a democratic society" 
does not mean that there must be a "pressing social need" for 
the legislation. 103 Rather, the legislation will satisfy the require-
ment if, without it, there is a risk that the goal will not be 
achieved. 104 
Notwithstanding the objections raised in the dissents, the Eu-
ropean Court has continued to follow the position adopted in 
Dudgeon. In Norris v. Ireland, the Court recently invalidated so-
domy statutes in the Republic of Ireland.105 It concluded, in 
accordance with the Dudgeo.n standard, that the "detrimental ef-
fects" of these statutes on the lives of gay people outweighed the 
102 Id. at 173. 
lOS Id. at 174-75. Judge Matscher wrote: 
Id. 
[I]t is said that the adjective "necessary" implies the existence of a "pressing social 
need" to interfere in the manner in question. In my opinion, once it is accepted 
that an aim is lawful within the meaning of article 8(2), any measure directed 
toward this aim is necessary when, if the measure is not taken, there is a risk 
that the aim will not be achieved. It is only in this context that one discusses 
whether a certain measure is necessary and, to add a new element, whether the 
merit of the aim is in proportion to the seriousness of the measure. Since the 
adjective "necessary" refers solely to the measures (means), it does not allow the 
lawfulness of the aim itself to be "weighed" which the judgment seems to do by 
relating "necessary" to "pressing social need." 
104 Id. at 175. 
105 Norris v. Ireland, 13 EUR. H.R. REP. 186, 201 (1989). The Court reviewed the 
validity of three statutes still in force in Ireland. The 1861 Act stated that: "Whosoever 
shall be convicted of the abominable crime of buggery, committed either with mankind 
or with any animal, shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude for life." Id. at 189. Section 
62 of the 1861 Act provided that: 
Id. 
Whosoever shall attempt to commit the said abominable crime, or shall be guilty 
of any assault with intent to commit the same, or of any indecent assault upon a 
male person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof 
shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude for any term not exceeding ten years. 
Section II of the Criminal Law Amendement Act [of] 1885 stated that: 
Any male person who, in public or in private, commits, or is a party to the 
commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male 
person of, any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof shall be liable at the discretion 
of the court to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or 
without hard labour. 
Id. at 189-90. 
The three statutes were interpreted by the Norris court as providing some discretion to 
the trial judge in sentencing. Id. at 190. 
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protection of public morals. lo6 The Court expressly rejected the 
view of the Irish Government that the Dudgeon standard effec-
tively eliminates the morals exception from article 8(2) of the 
European Convention. 107 It concluded that the deferential ap-
proach, which the Irish Government suggested, would leave state 
discretion in the area of public morals unfettered. lOB Referring 
to Dudgeon, the Court stated that such broad deference to local 
judgments cannot be warranted where the state intrudes on a 
"most intimate aspect of private life."109 
B. The United States 
Unlike the decisions of the European Court, U.S. case law 
discussing the right to privacy does not consider the language of 
international human rights instruments. Rather, U.S. cases inter-
pret the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution. l1O Thus, U.S. case law will not aid in inter-
preting restrictions on the right to privacy in international human 
rights instruments. It will, however, aid in defining the types of 
interests that can be reasonably included within the privacy 
right. lll 
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court held that the right 
to privacy does not protect all private sexual conduct between 
consenting adults. I 12 The Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
Georgia sodomy statute prohibiting all oral and anal sex acts. 113 
Recognizing the danger of judges imposing their own values on 
106 [d. at 200-01. In reasoning echoing that found in Dudgeon, the court concluded 
that there was no pressing social need to proscribe all private consensual homosexual 
activity in order to protect public morals. [d. at 200. As in Dudgeon, the court noted that 
there was no tremendous public opposition to private consensual homosexual activity in 
the Republic of Ireland. [d. at 198. 
107 [d. at 199. 
lOB /d. at 199-200. 
109 [d. at 200. 
110 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (declaring woman's right to abortion); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (declaring right of single persons to use 
contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (declaring right of 
married persons to use contraceptives). 
III Statute of the I.C.]., supra note 68, at art. 38(l)(d). 
112 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). 
113 [d. at 188. The Georgia statute criminalized sodomy, making it punishable by 
imprisonment for not less than one year and not more than 20 years. The statute defined 
sodomy as "any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus 
of another .... " [d. 
1992] GAY PRIVACY RIGHTS 157 
the U.S. Constitution,l14 the Court defined the right to privacy 
narrowly. It concluded that the right to privacy protects only 
matters related to family, marriage, and procreation. ll5 
Concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy 
was not broad enough to protect the interests of gay people, the 
Court refused to recognize an independent fundamental right 
"to engage in homosexual sodomy."ll6 It indicated that the Four-
teenth Amendment only protects those fundamental liberties "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty such that neither liberty 
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed" or "deeply rooted 
in this Nation's history and tradition."ll7 The Court thought it 
obvious that a right to homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental 
right. IIB Thus, because no fundamental right had been violated, 
the Court deferred to the judgment of the Georgia legislature 
that sodomy should be criminalized to protect morality.119 
114 [d. at 194. The majority stated: "The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest 
to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cog-
nizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution." [d. 
115 [d. at 190. Justice White wrote for the majority: 
Accepting decisions in these cases and the above description of them, we think 
it evident that none of the rights announced in those cases [declaring the right 
to privacy] bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homo-
sexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case. No connection 
between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual 
activity on the other has been demonstrated .... Moreover, any claim that these 
cases nevertheless stand for the proposition that any kind of private sexual 
conduct is constitutionally insulated from state proscriptions is unsupportable. 
[d. at 190-91. 
116 [d. at 191-92. "Precedent aside, however, respondent would have us announce, as 
the Court of Appeals did, a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy." [d. at 
191. 
117 [d. at 191-92. 
118 [d. at 192. The majority opinion states: 
It is obvious to us that neither of these formulations would extend a funda-
mental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy. Proscrip-
tions against that conduct have ancient roots. Sodomy was a criminal offense at 
common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen States when 
they ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws. In 
fact, until 1961, all 50 states outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 states and the 
District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy per-
formed in private between consenting adults. Against this background, to claim 
that a right to engage in such conduct is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history 
and tradition" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" is, at best, facetious. 
[d. at 192-94. 
119 [d. at 196. The Court reasoned that: 
Even if the conduct at issue here is not a fundamental right, respondent asserts 
that there must be a rational basis for the law and that there is none in this case 
other than the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that 
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable. This is said to be an inade-
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun maintained that the 
majority had misstated the issue. He believed that the case was 
not about a right to commit sodomy, but about "the most com-
prehensive of rights and the right most highly valued by civilized 
men, namely, the right to be let alone."120 Justice Blackmun 
thought that the Court had interpreted prior case law too nar-
rowly. In his view, the right to privacy is not limited only to a 
family, marriage, or procreational context, but extends to all 
decisions that are proper for individuals to make. 121 
Justice Blackmun rejected the majority's conclusion that the 
long and passionately held moral convictions of the people of 
Georgia were sufficient grounds for the statute. 122 On the con-
trary, he believed that the fact that gay men and lesbians live in 
a manner that upsets the majority of people is reason for the 
courts to be especially sensitive to their rights. 123 He also stated 
that religious values were not sufficient justification for the stat-
Id. 
quate rationale to support the law. The law, however, is constantly based on 
notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to 
be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed. 
120 Id. at 199 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis,]., 
dissenting)). 
121 Id. at 204-05. Justice Blackmun wrote: 
The Court concludes today that none of our prior cases dealing with various 
decisions that individuals are entitled to make free of governmental interference 
"bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to 
engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case." While it is true that these 
cases [declaring the right to privacy] may be characterized by their connection 
to procreation or the family, the Court's conclusion that they extend no further 
than this boundary ignores the [fact that] ... [w]e protect those rights not 
because they contribute, in some direct material way, to the general public 
welfare, but because they form so central a part of an individual's life. "The 
concept of privacy embodies the moral fact that a person belongs to himself and 
not others nor to society as a whole." 
Id. (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747, 777 (1986) (Stevens,]., concurring)). 
Id. 
122 Id. at 210-11. Justice Blackmun wrote: 
I cannot agree that either the length of time a majority has held its convictions 
or the passions with which it defends them can withdraw legislation from the 
Court's scrutiny. As Justice Jackson wrote so eloquently ... "we apply the 
limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and 
spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization .... 
[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would 
be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as 
to things that touch the heart of the existing order." 
12' Id. at 211. Justice Blackmun wrote: "It is precisely because the issue raised by this 
case touches the heart of what makes individuals what they are that we should be especially 
sensitive to the rights of those whose choices upset the majority." Id. 
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ute,124 stating that "the legitimacy of secular legislation depends 
instead on whether the State can advance some justification for 
its law beyond its conformity to religious doctrine."125 
Although Bowers v. Hardwick is helpful in trying to define the 
scope of the right to privacy in international law, it has limited 
utility. The majority's concerns about expanding the right to 
privacy to protect gay people are partially due to that right's 
status under the U.S. Constitution. Unlike international human 
rights instruments, the U.S. Constitution does not mention a right 
to privacy. Rather, it is a judicial extrapolation from the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Recognizing the 
danger of judicial overextension, the Court adopted a very con-
servative approach, concluding that the right to privacy should 
be expanded cautiously.126 
IV. CULTURAL OPPOSITION TO HOMOSEXUALITY 
Many states restrict gay people's right to privacy because of 
moral objections to homosexuality. The international human 
rights instruments appear to permit such restrictions because they 
do not confer the right to privacy in absolute terms. 127 Indeed, 
they expressly permit interference with an individual's private 
life to protect the general welfare and morality. 128 
Moral objections to homosexuality are common throughout the 
world. The Christian and Jewish religions have historically con-
demned homosexuality.129 Islam has similarly proscribed homo-
sexual activity.130 In recent years, however, religious opposition 
to homosexuality has been criticized. Some scholars dispute the 
interpretation of scriptural passages commonly invoked to con-
124 [d. at 211-12. Justice B1ackmun wrote: 
A State can no more punish private behavior because of religious intolerance 
than it can punish such behavior because of racial animus .... No matter how 
uncomfortable a certain group may make the majority of the Court, we have 
held that "mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify 
the deprivation of a person's physical liberty." 
[d. (quoting O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)). 
125 [d. at 211. 
126 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
127 See supra notes 32, 45-48 and accompanying text. 
128 [d. 
129 Genesis 19, Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13, Romans 1:26-27. 
ISO INTERNATIONAL LESBIAN AND GAY ASSOCIATION, SECOND ILGA PINK BOOK 154 (1988) 
[hereinafter ILGA). 
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demn homosexuality.131 Some historians point to past tolerance 
of homosexuality in both Christian132 and Muslim societies. 133 
Furthermore, the process of secularization in many nations makes 
religious concerns irrelevant in secular law. 134 
The international legal trend reflects this process of seculariza-
tion. Most European nations have abandoned their sodomy 
laws. 135 In recent years, many common law countries have re-
pealed or refused to enforce such statutes. In the United King-
dom, homosexual acts are legal between most persons over the 
age of twenty-one. 136 Ireland has abandoned its sodomy statute. 137 
In the United States, twenty-six states have abandoned their so-
domy statutes. 138 New Zealand has amended its sodomy statute, 
legalizing homosexual activity between persons over the age of 
sixteen. 139 Australia has decriminalized homosexual conduct in 
the Capital territory, New South Wales, South Australia, and 
Victoria. 140 
Religious and moral opposition to homosexuality are fre-
quently the justification for laws criminalizing homosexual con-
duct. The use of religious views to justify secular legislation, 
however, has been criticized in recent years. The international 
legal trend decriminalizing homosexual conduct reflects this crit-
ICIsm. 
V. EXTENDING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY TO GAY PEOPLE 
Expanding the right to privacy in the international human 
rights instruments to protect gay people from state persecution 
would certainly not be accepted in many parts of the world. 
Indeed, an attempt to do so might fuel arguments that interna-
tional human rights law is no more than an imposition of the 
131 See generally JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY 
(1980). 
132 Id. 
133 John Boswell, Revolutions, Universal, and Sexual Categories, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: 
RECLAIMING THE GAY AND LESBIAN PAST 27-28 (1989). 
134 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
135 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
136 ILGA, supra note 130, at 231. 
137 Kieran Cooke, Irish Government to Legalize Homosexuality, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1990, 
at 2. 
13B See EDS. OF THE HARV. L. REV., SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 9 (1989). 
139 ILGA, supra note 130, at 221. 
140 /d. at 219. 
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values of the rich and powerful nations of Western Europe and 
North America on the rest of the world. 141 Such an imposition 
could itself constitute a violation of human rights law by denying 
to less powerful nations the dignity of their religious and cultural 
values. 142 The process of incorporating international human 
rights law into any society must, therefore, carefully account for 
the local culture. 143 
Deference to the values of such societies, however, cannot be 
absolute. International human rights law extends rights both to 
individuals and minorities, often against the will of the majority 
culture. 144 For example, international law has recognized the 
rights of religious and ethnic minorities 145 as well as those of 
racial minorities. 146 
The right to privacy is such an internationally recognized hu-
man right 147-it will not automatically yield to majority opposi-
tion. None of the international instruments, however, recognizes 
the right to privacy in absolute terms. 148 Rather, they expressly 
permit interference with an individual's private life to protect the 
general welfare and morality.149 While states are not permitted 
141 SIEGHART, supra note 12, at 15. 
14~ See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
143 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 EUR. H.R. REP. 149, 172 (1981) (Zekia, j., dis-
senting). 
144 American Convention, supra note 7, at art. I; International Covenant, supra note 7, 
at art. 2(1); European Convention, supra note 7, at art. I. 
The International Covenant states: "[E]ach State Party to the present Covenant under-
takes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant .... " International Covenant, 
supra note 7, at art. 2(1). 
The European Convention states: "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to every-
one within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Conven-
tion." European Convention, supra note 7, at art. I. 
The American Convention states: "The States Parties to this Convention undertake to 
respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to 
their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms .... " American 
Convention, supra note 7, at art. I. 
145 International Covenant, supra note 7, at art. I. Article 27 states: "In those States in 
which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities 
shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language." 
[d. 
146 See generally International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N .T.S. 195. 
147 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
148 See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text. 
149 Id. 
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to enact restrictions that would render the right to privacy a 
nullity,150 states do appear to enjoy some discretion in determin-
ing the extent of interference. 
Local sentiment should be considered, especially when a con-
troversial issue, like homosexuality, is involved. 151 Even the Dud-
geon Court, when analyzing the extent to which Northern Ireland 
could restrict the privacy rights of homosexuals, factored local 
sentiment against homosexuality into its analysis. 152 Failure to 
account for local cultural values can only undermine the legiti-
macy of international human rights law. 
Nonetheless, interference with the right to privacy, at least in 
democratic societies, should be limited. In such societies, intol-
erance cannot be used to justify public policy,153 especially when 
the resulting burden on the affected individual or minority is 
very great. 154 As a matter of policy, the standard adopted to 
interpret the scope of the right to privacy in the international 
instruments, at least for persons living in democratic nations, 
must reflect the fact that people in those nations greatly value 
their personal autonomy.155 
The loose standards articulated in the Bowers majority 
opinion156 and the dissents in Dudgeon157 are too weak to further 
this policy. These standards would permit local governments to 
substitute their own moral judgments for those of the affected 
individuals. Such a standard would render a nullity both the 
rights to privacy and to conscience recognized in the international 
instruments. 
Thus, as the European Court has held when interpreting the 
right to privacy in the European Convention, interference with 
the right to privacy should be permitted only when there is a 
pressing social need for such interference which outweighs the 
burden on the individual. 158 T-his standard would prevent states 
from criminalizing homosexual conduct outright, given the bur-
den that such an action would impose on gay people. 159 The 
150 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
151 MERRILLS, supra note 65, at 145. 
152 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
153 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
154 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 EUR. H.R. REP. 149, 165 (1981). 
155 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
156 See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text. 
157 See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text. 
158 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
159 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 EUR. H.R. REP. 149, 167 (1981). 
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standard might not, however, preclude nations from favoring 
their own cultural values in a less burdensome fashion-for ex-
ample, by only allowing heterosexual marriages. 16o 
The texts of the Universal Declaration and the American Con-
vention support the application of a privacy standard developed 
in the context of democratic societies. The language of these two 
instruments is similar to the language of the European Conven-
tion, permitting restrictions on the right to privacy only in the 
context of a democratic society.161 The Universal Declaration al-
lows lawful interference with the right to privacy where necessary 
in a democratic society to protect morality. 162 Likewise, the Amer-
ican Convention only permits interference with the individual's 
right to privacy where necessary in a democratic society to pro-
mote the general welfare. 163 Thus, the scope of the right to pri-
vacy in the Universal Declaration and the American Convention 
appears as broad as that of the European Convention, which 
protects gay people's privacy interests. 
The text of the International Covenant, however, does not 
construe the right to privacy in the context of a democratic so-
ciety. Rather, the International Covenant forbids only arbitrary 
interference with the right to privacy.164 Nonetheless, the text of 
the International Covenant does not support an interpretation of 
the right to privacy that would always permit states to substitute 
their moral judgments for those of individuals. Such a construc-
tion, besides greatly curtailing the scope of the privacy right, 
160 The European Commission has held that equal treatment of homosexuals does not 
follow from the privacy standard declared in Dudgeon. See X. v. United Kingdom, 11 EUR. 
H.R. REP. 49, 52 (1987) (sustaining the United Kingdom's refusal to grant residency status 
to the homosexual partner of a British subject); X. v. United Kingdom, 7 EUR. H.R. REP. 
145, 146 (1984) (upholding a higher age of consent for homosexuals). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the right to privacy does not necessarily preclude 
states from making value judgments of their own, favoring certain decisions over others. 
See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977). Sustaining a state law which did not 
exclude certain abortions from state funding, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
/d. 
[The) right [to privacy recognized in Roe v. Wade) protects the woman from 
unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to termi-
nate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the authority of a state to make 
a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that 
judgment by the allocation of public funds. 
161 See supra notes 32, 45, 47, 48 and accompanying text. 
162 Universal Declaration, supra note 8, at art. 29(2). 
163 American Convention, supra note 7, at art. 32(2). 
164 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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would violate rules of construction by effectively eliminating the 
right to conscience recognized in article 18( 1 ).165 
Although the scope of the right to privacy outlined in Dudgeon 
is potentially broad enough to offer gay people protection, the 
likelihood of enforcement of such a broad interpretation is ques-
tionable. This is especially so in authoritarian and totalitarian 
states and states where traditional religious values are still strong. 
Such states, unlike democracies, do not necessarily value tolerance 
and personal autonomy. They consider a broad interpretation of 
the right to privacy no more than an outside imposition. 166 Absent 
binding treaty obligations, gay people in those states cannot rely 
on the international human rights instruments to protect their 
human rights. 167 Nonetheless, given the seriousness of human 
rights violations against gay people, international human rights 
organizations should carefully monitor for abuses and protest 
them to the offending governments. 
CONCLUSION 
International law extends fundamental rights to privacy and 
conscience to all human beings, including gay men and lesbians. 
Nonetheless, these rights are systematically denied to gay people 
throughout the world because of religious and moral objections 
to homosexuality. The right to privacy in the international human 
rights instruments protects the personal decisions of gay people. 
Although enforcement of this right may be difficult, human 
rights organizations should protest human rights violations 
against gay people, especially in nondemocratic states. These gov-
ernments should not simply claim that protecting the human 
rights of gay people would be an imposition of western culture 
on the rest of the world. 
165 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
166 SIEGHART, supra note 12, at 15. 
167 RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, at § 703, cmt. c. 
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